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Two-year olds appreciate the dual nature of pictures 
 
Paintings and drawings are both symbolic representations and material objects—
Da Vinci’s Mona Lisa is at the same time a woman with an enigmatic smile and a 
canvas covered with strokes of paint. This duality, long recognized and studied by 
philosophers, psychologists, and artists (Gombrich, 1960; Ittelson, 1996; Bloom & 
Markson, 1998) may be difficult for children to understand.  Young children naturally 
“see through” pictures. If they see a line-drawing of a whisk, for instance, and hear it 
named (“This is a whisk”), they later extend the name to real-world whisks, not to other 
drawings (Preissler & Carey, 2004). However, they may not appreciate, as adults do, 
that the drawing is itself an object, a vehicle through which a whisk is represented. 
Indeed, young children sometimes treat a representation as if it were the represented 
object, as when trying to shake a picture of a rattle or step into a picture of a shoe 
(DeLoache, et al., 1998; Perner, 1991).   
Here we explore whether, when presented with a suitably simplified task, 2-
year-olds can flexibly see pictures as both representational and as objects in their own 
right. In our first study, we tested 30 2-year-old children (mean age: 30 months). Each 
trial involved four items—an unfamiliar object, a line-drawing of that object, a second 
unfamiliar object, and a line-drawing of this second object. In one condition, the 
experimenter pointed to one of the drawings, described it with a novel word, and asked 
subjects to generalize the word, e.g., "This is a wug. Can you show me another one?" In 
another condition, the experimenter asked the same question without using a new label: 
"Look at this. Can you show me another one?" 
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For adults, common nouns refer to kinds of objects (see Bloom, 2000), and so 
the “wug” question should be taken as applying not to the picture, but to what the 
picture depicts, and hence should be extended to the corresponding object.  In contrast, 
the “Look at this” question is more likely to simply be taken as referring to the picture 
itself, and is therefore more likely to be extended to the other picture. These were the 
children’s intuitions as well. When told about “a wug”, they chose the corresponding 
object 90% (27/30) of the time; when not given a word they chose the corresponding 
object only 30% of the time (9/30), a significant difference between conditions 
indicating reliable, opposite effects (27/30 -> z = 3.45, p<.001; 9/30 -> z = -2.36, 
p<.05). This effect of a novel word is consistent with other research concerning the role 
of language for facilitating categorization by young children (Xu, 2002; Waxman & 
Booth, 2003).  
In a second study, we used a simpler design to test 20 2-year-olds (mean age: 30 
months), by showing them a line-drawing depicting a novel object and making a 
statement about the drawing.  These statements were either: (1) this is a dax; (2) my 
sister has this in her house; (3) this is really neat; (4) this is my favorite; (5) my brother 
keeps this in his wallet. Some of these properties were intended to apply to the object 
that the picture represented ((1) and (2)); others were intended to apply better to the 
picture itself ((5)), and others applied well to both ((3) and (4)). 
After the statement was presented, the experimenter brought out the object that 
the drawing depicted, placed it next to the drawing, and asked which item(s) the 
property applied to (e.g., “Can you show me the one my sister has in her house?”)—the 
drawing, the object, or both. We also tested twenty adults with the same design telling 
them that we were validating a paradigm used with children.    
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The results are shown in Figure 1.  Note first that we replicate the finding for the 
first study—when a picture is named, children (and adults) assume the label refers to a 
represented object.  Both groups associate some statements mostly with objects (1, 2) 
others mostly to pictures ‘wallet’ (5), and still others both to pictures and to objects (3, 
4).  For children, the difference between the average score of the “dax” and “house” 
trials and the “wallet” trial is significant (paired two-tailed t test, t(19) = 2.90, prep = .96, 
d = 1.33), as it is for adults (paired two-tailed t test, t(19) = 3.76, prep = .99, d = 1.72).  
Results of difference scores between children and adults are not significant (between-
subjects ANOVA, F(1, 38) = .017, prep = .192, 2 < .001).  This suggests that children, 
like adults, understand that labels refer to depicted objects, and that other property 
statements can flexibly be applied to pictures or to objects. 
Children who are considerably younger than those tested here are capable of 
using and understanding symbolic representations—even 12-month-olds can use and 
understand words.  This is the first demonstration, however, that young children can 
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Figure 1.  Percentage of “object” attributions of each property statement: the average 
between (1) this is a dax and (2) my sister has this in her house; the average between (3) 
this is really neat and (4) this is my favorite; (5) my brother keeps this in his wallet.  
 
